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The core industries of the new information economy are characterized by imperfect
competition, asymmetric information or external effects. Thus, well-designed
microeconomic policies, in the form of competition policies, technology policies or
combinations of these, have strong potential of generating welfare improvements and
promoting social efficiency. This paper emphasizes innovation-intensive competition,
strong technological scale economies, network effects and complementarity between
system components as characteristic features of the core industries in the information
economy. With reference to these features the study explores the implications for
microeconomic policies from the point of view of competition analysis.
The combination of strong technological scale economies on the supply side and
network effects on the demand side makes market structures with high concentration
and dominant firms both likely and efficient. On the other hand, a firm possessing a
dominant market position and operating in a network industry has access to a more
efficient set of instruments in order to abuse its dominant market position relative to a
firm operating in a traditional industry. This study argues that the recognition of these
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JEL classification: L40, L50, O3two counteracting aspects forms a necessary condition for the design of successful
microeconomic policies in contemporary high-tech markets. It is also emphasized that
efficient competition policy in these markets has to face an inherent structural trade-off
between the exploitation of strong scale economies and the promotion of entry and
small enterprises.1
1 Introduction
Ever since the days of Adam Smith’s ‘indivisible hand’ the idea that a free and
decentralized market economy will generate a socially optimal allocation has been alive
among economists. This view was formalized in the famous contributions to the general
equilibrium theory by Debreu (1959) and Arrow and Hahn (1971). Since then analytical
research in the general equilibrium theory has offered a much richer characterization of
a competitive equilibrium and, in particular, its implications for social efficiency as well
as its restrictions. Broadly speaking, a free and decentralized market economy
represents a socially optimal allocation. However, conditions characterized by imperfect
competition, asymmetric information or external effects make competitive equilibria
socially inefficient. The overall goal of microeconomic policies is to promote social
efficiency by affecting either the competition strategies of firms or the organization of
industries in order to reduce the distortions created by competition under such market
conditions.
The core industries of the new information economy are characterized by imperfect
competition, asymmetric information or external effects. Consequently, in many
circumstances well-designed microeconomic policies, in the form of competition
policies, technology policies or combinations of these, have the potential of generating
welfare improvements and promoting social efficiency. This study attempts to present a
characterization of selected features of the core industries in the new information
economy and to explore the crucial microeconomic consequences of the technological
revolution behind the emerging ‘new’ information economy from the point of view of
competition analysis. In particular, we explore the challenges created by innovation-
intensive core industries in the information economy for the authorities implementing
competition and technology policies.
Most industrial nations have experienced a transition to an information-based economy
in the sense that information and communication technology (ICT) comprises an ever-
greater share of GDP and boosts productivity and economic growth as surveyed by
Jalava and Pohjola (2001). They demonstrate that the contribution from the use of ICT
to output growth in the market sector has increased from 0.3 percentage to 0.7 points
during the 1990s in Finland for example, which is one of the leading ICT producers in
Europe. In fact, the importance of the new information economy to the global corporate
landscape is illustrated by Table 1, which shows how the top technology and telecomms
stocks are placed in The Financial Times 2001 ranking of the world’s 500 largest
companies (on the basis of market value). This list documents a clear US-dominance
among the largest ICT companies. The figures reported measure market values
calculated on 4 January 2001. Thus, the dotcom and telecommunications meltdown,
which began in the spring of 2000, is partly reflected in this table.
This article initially offers a systematic discussion of the typical features of the core
industries in the new information economy. We then proceed to successively explore
some crucial implications for microeconomic policies, in particular competition and
technology policies. Finally we delineate some prevalent business practices with a clear
policy-relevance from the point of view of microeconomic policies.2
Table 1
Top technology and telecomms stocks by market capitalization as of 4 January 2001
(in billions of US dollars)
FT500 Market value
Company rank 2001 Country $ billion Sector
Cicso Systems 2 US 304.7 Telecomm. equipment
Microsoft 5 US 258.4 Software
Vodafone Group 8 UK 227.1 Wireless telecomm. services
Intel 9 US 227.0 Semiconductors
Nokia 12 Finland 197.5 Telecomm. equipment
Oracle 14 US 182.3 Software
NTT DoCoMo 16 Japan 175.4 Wireless telecomm. services
SBC Communic. 17 US 174.8 Fixed-line telecomm. services
IBM 18 US 164.1 Computer hardware
Emc 20 US 156.0 Computer hardware
Verizon Comm. 21 US 147.9 Fixed-line telecomm. services
NTT 29 Japan 116.7 Fixed-line telecomm. services
Nortel Networks 30 Canada 113.4 Telecomm. equipment
China Mobile H K 34 Hong Kong 102.3 Wireless telecomm. services
Sun Microsystems 35 US 101.1 Computer hardware
AOL 36 US 100.3 Internet
France Telecom 39 France 96.7 Fixed-line telecomm. services
Deutsche Telekom 40 Germany 94.7 Fixed-line telecomm. services
Ericsson 43 Sweden 91.0 Telecomm. equipment
Texas Instruments 44 US 90.4 Semiconductors
Bellsouth 53 US 81.2 Fixed-line telecomm. services
AT & T 54 US 79.0 Fixed-line telecomm. services
Qwest Comm. Int. 59 US 75.9 Wireless telecomm. services
Telefonica 61 Spain 75.5 Fixed-line telecomm. services
Alcatel 67 France 68.3 Telecomm. equipment
Hewlett-Packard 68 US 67.3 Computer hardware
Telecom Italia Mobile 74 Italy 64.7 Wireless telecomm. services
Qualcomm 80 US 59.5 Telecomm. equipment
British Telecom 81 UK 59.0 Fixed-line telecomm. services
Telecom Italia 84 Italy 57.8 Fixed-line telecomm. services
Source: The Financial Times (2001).
2 Characteristics of the core industries in the New Economy
Competitive strategies in the fast-changing information economy are distinct from
strategies in the more traditional or static sectors of the economy. Therefore
microeconomic policies, for example competition policy, must be attuned to the new
strategies firms are employing. While durable monopoly power has always been rooted3
in underlying scale economies, the sources and magnitude of those scale economies, and
thereby the resulting barriers to entry, have changed as a consequence of the shift to the
network economy. Demand-side economies of scale associated with network
externalities are particularly important in many dynamic high-tech industries and this
form of scale economies adds to traditional, technologically determined scale
economies on the supply side.
At the risk of over-simplifying, we can characterize a number of typical features
associated with the core industries in the information economy. This list of typical
features has some common elements with the one presented by Shapiro (2000).
Understanding and recognizing these features is of key importance for the design of
microeconomic policies.
2.1 Innovation-intensive competition
Rapid innovation with short product-cycles is a key characteristic of the information
economy. In industries undergoing frequent technological revolutions, we can typically
identify cycles comprising two phases: an innovation phase and an imitation phase.
Innovating firms participating in the innovation phase may acquire a dominant market
position and during this phase the profit margins are protected by imperfect competition
due to inherent technological entry barriers. Over time these technological entry barriers
break down as intra- and inter-industry spillovers make it possible for imitating firms to
profitably enter the market and successively reduce the sustainable profit margins. Thus,
we can expect substantial profit margins to be sustainable only in the innovation phase.
Without investments into innovation no firm can maintain a dominant market position
in the long run. Just imagine, for example, what Nokia’s market share would be a
couple of years from now if it left innovation to Siemens, Ericsson, Motorola and a
number of Japanese firms with the capability of creating mobile phones with superior
technological features. It would, of course, plunge, making recovery extremely costly.
Consequently in the long run, competition within the information economy can be
classified as innovation-intensive Schumpeterian competition, where the firms are
engaged in a race for capturing future market shares within upcoming generations of
new technology. In this environment the firms have to make irreversible investments in
the presence of a substantial degree of uncertainty. In the short run, and with the
prevailing incumbent technology, competition takes place along traditional dimensions
like price.
Against this background it seems intuitively hard to explain the hysterically optimistic
expectations which were reflected in the stock prices of firms belonging to the core
industries of the information economy immediately after the millennium. Clearly, in a
historical perspective, P/E-ratios of technology stocks, and the IT-companies in
particular, have been at previously unseen levels (see Shiller 2000). Isn’t such an
observation logically inconsistent with the inherent short product-cycles of these
industries characterized by innovation-intensive competition, where successive
generations of new technology replace the previous with relatively high frequency? Is
there possibly the risk that investors have extrapolated the future potential of sustainable
profit-generation in the long run for these technology companies from a perspective
rooted in an innovation phase without taking into account that potential future entrants
into these industries will have inherently stronger incentives to invest in new
generations of technology?4
Table 2
Revenues from European 3G mobile spectrum auctions completed in 2000







It is indeed possible to refer to the fast growth of intangible capital during the 1990s as
an explanation for the extraordinary rise of the stock market in the United States. Hall
(2000) has recently incorporated a particular type of intangible asset, e-capital, into an
extended model of technology and productivity growth in order to explain how the
stock market boom simply reflects the market value of this e-capital. In Hall’s model,
e-capital is defined as the general business methods based on computers. This e-capital
is exhibited in the body of technical and organizational knowhow created by well-
educated human capital. It is also possible to design rational explanations for the highly
volatile stock market valuations relative to earnings of technology companies. Noe and
Parker (2000) have developed a model for the valuation of web-based firms based on a
‘winner-takes-all’ structure of high-fixed-cost, low-marginal-cost markets for
information goods. Within such a context, they show how competition between
websites may yield highly volatile and uncertain payoffs as well as highly skewed
return distributions.
In recent years auctions have played an increasingly important role for the development
of many high-tech industries. Governments have designed auction-based procedures for
allocating assets such as mobile-phone licenses and frequencies. As an illustration,
Table 2 shows the price per capita raised for rather similar blocks of spectrum
frequencies sold for third-generation mobile phone services in six European countries
during year 2000. These spectrum auctions cumulatively raised approximately US$100
billion, which constitutes more than 1.5 per cent of the combined GDP of these
countries. Similarly the emergence and growth of e-commerce have encouraged the
process of substituting bilateral negotiations with auctions as a trading mechanism.
Even though the per capita revenue from the spectrum auctions can be seen as a rather
crude measure, it is clear from Table 2 that we have witnessed huge fluctuations in the
license valuations of these operators during the year 2000. In fact, analysts were
estimating 400-600 Euros per capita from the Swiss auction (the last of the auctions
included in Table 2) as late as one week prior to this auction. Thus, as an allocation
mechanism, auctions seem to be fraught with volatility even though the observed
fluctuations could possibly also be explained as a high systematic elasticity of the
auction outcome to variations in auction design (see Klemperer 2001).5
2.2 Technological scale economies and product versions
The core industries in the information economy exhibit very strong economies of scale
so that the costs are predominantly of a sunk character in the form of ‘first-copy costs’.
Thus, the marginal costs of producing additional copies are far below average costs.
Clearly in the presence of Internet this pattern has been accentuated since Internet
makes the costs of physical replication and distribution negligible. This change in the
production functions will show up as increased price-cost margins, widening the gap
between market equilibrium and social efficiency, at least when evaluated with the
traditional static methods familiar from industrial economics.
Accentuated scale economies create strong incentives for firms to design mechanisms,
making it possible to exploit the variations among consumers in their willingness to pay.
As Varian (1999) has emphasized, by systematically introducing different product
versions equipped with different degrees of associated characteristics, the firms can
create screening mechanisms for price discrimination based on the consumers’ self-
selection. For example, the producers of mobile phones have successfully exploited
business strategies based on versioning.
2.3 Network externalities
In the presence of network externalities, goods or services are more valuable the higher
the number of consumers using them. Thus, through these network effects the
information economy is characterized by strong demand-side economies of scale.
Typically, network externalities can be expected to imply highly concentrated industries
and thereby to have strong implications for market structure. Similarly, the network
effects will impact on firms’ conduct, because the equilibrium prices will depend on
network size (number of users). For these reasons, the network externalities will
strongly affect competition dynamics. Network externalities create switching costs and
lock-in effects, whereby an incumbent firm—as soon as it has accumulated a
sufficiently extensive consumer base, the critical mass—is able to expand its market
shares without necessarily being more efficient than its competitors. As a strategic
implication one can expect the network industries to generate a race for achieving the
critical mass. Investments made in order to achieve the critical mass will generate a
long-term return based on the fact that having achieved such a critical mass, these firms
can sustain a price-cost marginal which is protected from competition by a barrier
represented by the switching costs.
In the presence of network effects, innovation-intense Schumpeterian competition tends
to generate an intertemporal pattern of technological leaders. The leaders temporarily
enjoy huge market shares until dominance is overtaken by superior technology
leapfrogging the current leader. This phenomenon can be illustrated by observations
from the software industry. In 1990 Word Perfect was estimated to have a market share
of 50 per cent, while Microsoft Word had 10 per cent. By 1997 the picture had changed
radically. By this time Microsoft Word had achieved the dominant position with a
market share of almost 95 per cent, while Word Perfect had crashed to less than 5 per
cent. Spreadsheets offer another example. Lotus 1-2-3 enjoyed a 70 per cent market
share in 1988, while that of Microsoft Excel was approximately 10 per cent. Again, by6
1997 the role of these competitors had reversed, with Microsoft Excel holding a market
share of 90 per cent, while Lotus 1-2-3 had below 10 per cent.
2.4 Complementarity between system components
Electronic devices, such as computers, are composed of components that form systems.
But not until the modern type of information economy have so many complementary
products been so tightly bound up through interfaces. As a result, firms spend huge
resources forming strategic alliances, setting standards and collaborating with partners
to make sure that their products work together effectively to comprise a competitive
overall system.
Systematic bundling of complementary products is a business strategy frequently
observed in the information economy. Due to complementarities between included
components, the strategic advantages may increase as a function of the size of the
bundle. Such bundling advantages may be one explanation as to why Microsoft
achieved dominance in the Office software suite despite the existence of well-
established rivals in each component.
Nalebuff (2000) offers a theoretical model capturing the strategic advantages of
bundling within the framework of an industry characterized by actual or potential
competition. While it is not surprising that bundling leads to higher profits, Nalebuff
(2000) demonstrates a mechanism based on external effects as to why consumers also
may benefit from product bundles when there is a complementary relationship between
the components. Thus, in the presence of sufficiently strong complementarities,
concentration-enhancing bundling could promote efficiency.
So far we have outlined a number of characteristic features of the core industries in the
new information economy. In the last subsection we briefly present one vision of how to
accurately model competition in an industry with all the features delineated above.
2.5 A real options approach to timing competition
For firms operating in the innovation-intensive core industries of the new information
economy, the timing for the implementation of irreversible investments—like the
adoption of new technologies—represents a crucial strategic instrument, the importance
of which is emphasized through the presence of network effects. Typically these types
of irreversible investments are made in the presence of a substantial degree of
uncertainty. This can be exemplified by the European telecommunication industry. This
industry is in the process of investing more than US$ 300 billion over the next three or
four years with the intention of bringing together the two hottest technologies of the
moment, the mobile phone and the Internet, in the form of third-generation (3G)
UMTS-networks. This highly risky investment is split, more or less evenly, between
money paid to the governments for the spectrum licenses and investments for building
new broadband networks to transport data at high speed. Platform investments, like
Internet portals with the objective of creating a network for efficient, low-cost access to
customers, offer still another example of a similar type of investment characterized by
irreversibility and uncertainty. Such a platform investment can be viewed as the
acquisition of a set of strategic entry options.7
In a world characterized by uncertainty, new technology adoption can be viewed as a
decision whereby the stochastic process generating a firm’s cash flow is transformed
from one process to another. Within such a framework the optimal adoption timing can
be characterized by applying the real options approach familiar from modern investment
theory. However, the real options literature has typically been restricted to two very
specific assumptions: (i) the representative firm has a monopoly with respect to an
investment opportunity and (ii) the underlying product market is perfectly competitive.
As a result, the investment affects neither prices nor market structure.
In order to make the real options approach particularly useful as a way of modelling
competition in the new economy, it needs to be generalized in two important
dimensions. Firstly, in order to analyse industries in which firms in possession of
market power compete with each other, we ought to incorporate imperfect competition
so that there is strategic interaction between the adoption decision of the competing
firms. Secondly, in order to capture system complementarity and network effects, we
should incorporate the benefits of adopting new technology when competitors also do
so. Within such a framework one could ask the following questions: What type of
adoption pattern will be generated through competition? What is the relationship
between the adoption equilibrium, the stochastic properties of the incumbent and new
technologies in terms of, for example, the drift rate and the volatility if the technologies
are represented as geometric Brownian motions, and the market structure? How will
network effects, uncertainty and strategic pre-emption incentives interact? Under what
circumstances will there be a role for government intervention in the form adoption
policies? The real options approach recently applied in Alvarez and Stenbacka (2001a
and 2001b) probably serves as a useful analytical basis for such a research programme.
3 Competition policy in the information economy
In general, vertical or horizontal integration tends to be pro-competitive as long as
decisions of the firms are strategic complements to markets with imperfect competition.
Further, mergers or strategic alliances can be expected to promote innovation activities
that make use of complementary system components to create new products or new
value-creating combinations of existing system components. In this respect, increased
concentration tends to enhance the innovation performance of industries. On the other
hand, increased concentration enables firms to exploit bundling strategies in order to
extract the increased willingness of consumers to pay for more integrated bundles of
products or services.
In particular, the presence of network externalities makes it possible for a firm to
achieve a dominant market position, in the sense of antitrust legislation, at a lower
market share than what would be the case in a ‘traditional’ industry. Similarly, a firm
possessing a dominant market position and operating in a network industry has access to
a larger number as well as more efficient strategic instruments in order to abuse its
dominant market position relative to a firm operating in a traditional industry. For that
reason, structural microeconomic policies in the form of competition policy and
antitrust legislation can be regarded to have potentially a higher social rate of return
when applied within the innovation-intensive core industries of the information
economy than within the traditional industries. As a consequence thereof, the potential8
gains from these microeconomic policies can be expected to increase relative to those
associated with macroeconomic policies.
The implementation of competition policy, however, might be more difficult in the core
information industries than in the traditional industries. In the new economy,
competition policy concepts and instruments need to be modified so as to fit not only
the traditional and static views of competition, but also the dynamic features of
competition in the high-tech network industries, as emphasized by Ahlborn, Evans and
Padilla (2000).
Competition laws in modern economies, exemplified by Article 86 of the EC Treaty
(the Treaty of Rome), typically prohibit any abuse of dominant market power. Thus, the
documentation of market dominance constitutes a necessary condition for competition
policy interventions. Market dominance, in turn, has to be verified in relationship to a
well-defined relevant market.
As for the definition of a relevant market, the implementation of competition law
typically pays attention to three main features: demand substitutability, supply
substitutability and potential competition. Along these three dimensions, the emergence
of high-tech network industries tends to shift the emphasis from demand substitutability
towards uncertain potential competition from future generations of superior products.
The Schumpeterian nature of the industry dynamics in the high-tech network industries
will by necessity imply high industry concentration. When evaluating market
dominance, present market shares should obviously be discounted as measures of
market power insofar as potential future entry serves to constrain the conduct of
incumbent firms with large market shares. Such a view seems to be in line with last
year’s court decision in the highly visible Microsoft case. This court decision dictates a
horizontal division of Microsoft’s activities so that the operating systems are separated
from the production of software applications. As a justification for its decision the Court
considered the current dominant market position of Microsoft as discouraging
innovation and technological progress in the industry, but the court did not refer to any
abuse of dominant market position in the form of pricing conduct.
3.1 Competition policy: challenges ahead
Monopoly tends to be good for the owners, but bad for the consumers. Common
wisdom among economists further suggests that the negative impact on consumers
tends to dominate relative to the positive profit effects associated with monopolization.
This divergence explains, in a nutshell, why governments employ antitrust policies.
However, technological progress, network externalities and international competition all
represent disturbances relative to the common wisdom outlined above. With the
innovation-intense competition typical for the information economy, innovation is
increasingly driven by firms that win temporary monopoly power, but enjoy it only for a
moment before being replaced by a company with a better product which also gains a
short-lived monopoly position. This suggests that the information economy may feature
more monopolies than the traditional sectors of the economy, but that these monopolies
may harm consumers only for a limited period of time. Indeed, if these market dynamics
encourage innovation, consumers might actually benefit from the dynamic efficiency9
generated by high market concentration. Analogously, the presence of network
externalities offers additional strategic instruments whereby incumbent firms might be
able to abuse dominant market positions. Finally, the presence of export revenues in
imperfectly competitive international markets, in turn, means a shift in the trade-off
between consumer and producer interests.
Future research on competition policy should attach particular priority to the general
characterizations of optimal national competition policy as well as its implementation in
the presence of endogenous technological progress, network effects and international
competition. The existing literature has typically addressed competition policy issues in
the absence of network externalities and in the absence of international trade. Access
pricing is a good example of a policy that promotes competition among firms in
industries exhibiting network effects (e.g., telecommunication services). In fact, a large
majority of the antitrust cases that have during the past few years reached the
Competition Council in Finland, for example, focus on firms operating in network
industries.
There are strong reasons why future policy-related research in this field should pay
particular attention to the implementation issues. How should access pricing be
designed and what should the relationship be between regulatory authorities and
competition authorities when it comes to network industries? What is generally the
optimal design of the competition-promoting agency, i.e. what objectives given to the
competition authorities represent an optimal form of strategic delegation? How can
competition authorities overcome the barriers created by asymmetric information in
relationship to the firms? How can leniency programmes, for example, be exploited to
induce self-reporting on behalf of cartel members?
The importance of precisely identifying the objective(s) which competition policy is
supposed to achieve is emphasized by the characteristics of the information economy.
Namely, the information economy is likely to magnify the conflict between consumer
welfare, on the one hand, and plausible alternative objectives such as fairness relative to
competitors or the promotion of small- and medium-sized enterprises, on the other hand.
Namely, the combination of economies of scale on the supply side and network effects
on the demand side tends to make concentrated markets consistent with efficiency, and
mechanical attempts to keep the market artificially fragmented are likely to damage not
only the industry, but also the consumers. In spite of the tendency for single firms to
dominate high-tech industries, these firms are unable to persistently sustain monopoly
positions, either by raising prices or by failing to innovate. Lurking behind every corner
are potential threats to dominance. In fact, the recent history of high-tech industries
offers many examples of once-dominant firms that have failed to run hard enough to
defend their dominance—McDonnell-Douglas, Polaroid and Silicon Graphics to name a
few examples.
3.2 Supranational versus national competition policy
The basic trade-off that countries face in constructing their competition policies is that
between firm profits and consumer welfare. However, if the consumers affected by the
collusion are not citizens, this trade-off disappears since firms are exporters and
competition policy is guided by the search for export profits. Thus, in the presence of
international trade, competition policies implemented on a national level will mean that10
countries impose substantial external effects on each other. Consequently, increased
international economic integration enhances the benefits from international coordination
of competition policies. Thus, in Europe, the European Commission plays an
increasingly important role as a coordinating supranational institution for competition
policy and antitrust implementation. For example, the number of mergers reported to the
European Commission has increased to almost 350 cases per year.
However, centralizing competition policy to a supranational institution like the
European Commission causes a number of problems, as exemplified by the recent
blocked merger planned between the two Swedish motor vehicle makers, Volvo and
Scania. The Volvo-Scania case brought into daylight the question of whether small
countries, like the Nordic ones, are at a disadvantage if the Commission’s definition of
market dominance automatically refers to fairly small and segmented national markets
rather than to the European market in a broader sense.
In light of the ongoing worldwide process of globalization, whereby an increasing share
of all national economies are exposed to international competition, the following
questions have very high priority: Is it optimal from a global perspective to centralize
the conduct of competition policy to a supranational institution? How should
supranational competition policy be conducted? When are there reasons to delegate
competition policy to national authorities?
4 Technology policy in the information economy
4.1 Innovation policies
Intellectual property rights constitute the heart of the new information economy.
Innovation-enhancing technology policies can broadly be classified into two types:
subsidies and patents (copyrights) and standards. Subsidies represent an ex ante
commitment on behalf of the government to share a part of the risks associated with
investments into innovation. In contrast, patents represent an ex post reward directed
towards successful innovations with no ex ante risk sharing.
Following Denicolo (1996), for example, optimal patent policy can generally be
summarized by the following principle. If the marginal rate of substitution of patent life
for breadth is larger (smaller) on the incentive to innovate than on social welfare, the
optimal patent policy is characterized by maximum (minimum) breadth and minimum
(maximum) length. However, presently the pace at which generations of successively
improved technologies replace each other seems to be so fast in many of the central
areas of the information economy, like in the software industry, that it renders the patent
instrument fairly irrelevant. In these industries firms obviously have very limited
incentives to employ the patent instrument in the first place. In fact, Shy and Thisse
(1999) formalize this idea by focusing on the strategic reasons for oligopoly firms to
drop software protection. Within the context of a differentiated software industry, they
demonstrate that unprotecting is an equilibrium for a noncooperative industry under
sufficiently strong network effects. Thus, Shy and Thisse offer a plausible strategic
reason based on the importance of the degree of network externalities prevailing in the
industry as to why the use of software protection has declined since the mid-1980s.11
Bessen and Maskin (1999) address the issue of why industries such as software,
semiconductors and computers have been so innovative despite historically weak patent
protection. They actually build a formal model, which shows that patent protection may
in fact reduce overall innovation and social welfare if there are sequential generations of
technology and if the innovation activities are complementary. The central analytical
feature of the model by Bessen and Maskin can be captured by the following
intertemporal effect. Although imitation reduces the innovator’s current profit, it raises
the probability of further innovation and thereby strengthens the incentives for future
innovations.
Should the technologies underlying the new information economy, like IT-investments,
be subsidized? In principle, these technologies constitute a natural candidate for subsidy
policies, as they are associated with external effects and in many cases they are
examples of multi-purpose technologies. However, the successful design of a subsidy
policy requires from the policymaker knowledge and accurate assessments of the future
technological development. There are strong reasons to believe that the firms active in
these markets are better equipped to make these assessments than bureaucrats or
politicians.
Empirical evidence indicates that the technology of a country typically tends to be
distorted towards those production factors in which it is well endowed. For example,
countries well endowed with qualified human capital tend to adopt production
technologies that match the high qualifications of human capital (see, for example,
Caselli and Coleman 2000). Thus, an emphasis on the accumulation of human capital
can contribute to a fast and successful development of the IT-industry. But, in principle,
there seems to be no fundamental reason as to why market mechanisms would not be
able to achieve—or to achieve with less success than politically administered
solutions—the allocation of human capital consistent with growth of the high-tech
industries.
4.2 Adoption and imitation policies
In the early 1990s many participants in the American policy debate (for example,
Branscomb 1992) forcefully argued that a technology policy which is restricted to
supporting the creation of new technologies is not sufficient. Instead, it was argued,
emphasis should additionally be placed on stimulating demand for new technology by
helping industrial companies across the industrial spectrum to speed up the
commercialization of new ideas to meet specific business needs. For example, the
technology policies behind the success of the Japanese consumption electronics industry
were founded on a priority that supported efficient adoption of existing technologies
rather than towards the creation of new technologies (e.g., the adoption of high-
definition television, HDTV, in the early 1990s).
In a recent study of Asian countries, Wong (2001) finds that the more advanced Asian
countries (Japan and the four Asian NIEs) as a group achieved above-norm ICT
diffusion intensities, while the six less developed Asian nations significantly
underperformed relative to their level of economic development and competitiveness.
Thus, the less advanced Asian countries seem to have over-emphasized industrial policy
in favour of electronics manufacturing at the expense of promoting adoption of ICT in
the economy as a whole, particularly the service sectors. These observations may12
suggest that the human capital bottleneck might place a severe restriction on how fast
new technologies can be diffused in the late-industrializing countries despite the
possibilities of free-riding on the experience accumulated in innovating countries.
In many high-tech industries the ability to imitate requires conscious investments and
long-term developments of a knowledge stock. In such industries the knowledge
spillovers and thereby endogenous diffusion of technology are the consequences of
rational investments into imitation. Kanniainen and Stenbacka (2000) investigate how
the presence of such a type of imitation, which no doubt is relevant for high-tech
industries, calls for revisions of technology policy. Their analysis identifies
circumstances under which the market equilibrium will generate underinvestment in
imitation, leading to a suboptimal degree of technology diffusion. Such cases arise, for
example, in Cournot industries facing highly price-sensitive demand or in Bertrand
industries with modestly differentiated products. Under such conditions the optimal
technology policy combination calls for innovation policies to be complemented by
imitation-enhancing policies in line with the competition-enhancing policy implications
of Bessen and Maskin (1999).
4.3 Standards, compatibility and coordination
The information economy is characterized by frequent networks representing a diverse
spectrum of strategic alliances between high-tech firms. Cooperation in the design of
compatibility standards is a crucial area of cooperation between high-tech firms, in
particular in systems markets. The software industry reports examples where even fierce
rivals, such as Microsoft and Netscape, sign up to jointly design compatible standards.
What are the implications of cooperative standard setting? Will cooperation generate
efficient standards and consumer benefits or does cooperation simply represent a
collusion-enhancing mechanism whereby the participating firms could shift benefits
from consumers to producers?
We can directly point to two benefits associated with cooperative standard setting.
Firstly, to the extent that coordination enhances compatibility through an industrywide
standard, consumers will benefit from strengthened network effects. Secondly,
standards reduce the technology risks faced by consumers, since the risk of being left
stranded with incompatible system components is lowered. However, standardization
will also have social costs. Standardization will constrain product variety and possibly
limit available paths for innovation intended to create future technology generations.
With coordinated standard setting there could also reasonably be an increased risk of
cooperation being extended to the product market stage. In order to evaluate the overall
consequences of cooperative standard setting, we need to balance all these counteracting
effects against each other.
At least the following general conclusion can be drawn. In the presence of compatible
standards, firms face lower incentives to innovate because with standards the product
market competition tends to be more intense, meaning that the payoff from successful
innovation will be lower. Thus, as Shapiro (2000) concludes, standards shift the locus of
competition: incompatible systems compete in a dynamic sense for the market;
compatible-system products compete in a static sense in the market. In other words,
setting cooperative standards shifts the emphasis from dynamic innovation-oriented
competition towards static competition in the product market. Consequently,13
evaluations of cooperative standard-setting involve by necessity an intertemporal trade-
off, which is shifted more in favour of standards the greater the interest rate factor
according to which society discounts future benefits.
5 Some policy-relevant business features in the new information economy
So far the policy implications discussed have been either in the field of competition
policy or technology policy. However, a number of core industries in the new
information economy are characterized by numerous prevalent business practices with
obvious implications from a microeconomic policy perspective. In this section, we
focus on three such aspects, namely (i) market transparency, (ii) strategic outsourcing
and (iii) the interrelationship between compensation, bargaining and entrepreneurship.
5.1 Market transparency
The revolution in information technology has implications throughout the economy.
Information technology can be seen as an infrastructure with the potential to promote
economywide efficiency through changes in the microstructure of most markets. In
particular, the Internet represents a strong instrument in this respect. The Internet can
reduce the search costs faced by consumers and thereby reduce market imperfections
throughout the economy. In line with this prediction, a recent empirical study by Brown
and Goolsbee (2000) estimates that Internet has reduced term life prices by 8-15 per
cent in the American life insurance industry. In this way new technology can also make
certain intermediaries redundant, like many of the services offered by travel agents. In
addition to these fairly obvious economywide consequences, the Internet is often said to
promote efficiency by introducing market transparency.
Transparency has been a buzzword for a long time in consumer protection, in
competition policy and in informal evaluations of the consequences of the e-commerce,
for example. Improved market transparency is alleged to assist consumers in comparing
substitute goods or services and their prices. Seen in isolation, this should intensify
competition, and thereby enhance efficiency, by making consumers more sensitive to
perceived differences in the mix of price and commodity characteristics. This effect is
likely to have positive welfare implications, in particular in fragmented search markets.
However, it seems hard to improve the information to customers without affecting at the
same time the information and strategic incentives of firms. A priori there are at least
two mechanisms whereby firms in oligopolistic industries could benefit from improved
market transparency. Firstly, improved transparency enhances the ability of oligopolists
to sustain collusion as it enables detection of deviations from a tacitly collusive
agreement quicker and with greater precision. Secondly, improved transparency makes
it possible for tacitly colluding firms to sustain more severe punishments following a
deviation since consumers react more to perceived differences in the mix of price and
characteristics across products.
It is an important challenge for research in the near future to carry out an overall
evaluation, which incorporates both the efficiency-enhancing effects from better
informed consumers and the collusion-promoting effects of more precise information
transmission between firms, of the welfare implications of increased transparency.14
5.2 Strategic outsourcing
All over the industrialized world, outsourcing has become an increasingly popular
method for firms to organize their production in order to achieve competitiveness. This
applies in particular to several network industries. Many scattered observations support
such a view. Most producers of Laser printers do not make the engines, but buy these
instead from Canon, a Japanese manufacturer. Most computer companies outsource a
great deal. Whereas the Intel chips are patented (or copyrighted), PC producers have the
option of licensing production processes for making clone chips in-house. Thus, the
choice to buy chips from Intel can, in effect, be viewed as the outsourcing of a key
component. Further, for example, Sun Microsystem is considered to purchase between
75 and 80 per cent of its components from other companies (Domberger 1999). In the
telecommunications industry, it has been estimated that Nokia alone makes use of more
than three hundred domestic subcontractors in addition to an almost equally high
number of foreign subcontractors. Furthermore, casual observations suggest that it has
been a common business practice for competing product market firms to outsource
production to joint subcontractors, which can be exemplified by Ericsson and Nokia, the
competing mobile phone producers.
Even though the contract theory has been instrumental for understanding some
important aspects of a firm’s outsourcing decisions, the contract theory literature
typically has not captured the role of outsourcing in industries where firms compete
with their design of organizational production mode as the strategic instrument.
However, in a recent study, Shy and Stenbacka (2001) construct a model of firms using
their design of organizational production mode as a strategic instrument. They
investigate how the market structure of an input-producing industry will affect
production efficiency in a differentiated and imperfectly competitive final goods
market. Shy and Stenbacka demonstrate how introduction of competition among input
suppliers will achieve the double goal of making components available at average cost
without sacrificing the ability to exploit economies of scale, because in a subgame
perfect equilibrium firms will delegate production to a joint subcontractor. As this
feature is shown to be a robust outcome in several respects, we can conclude that
outsourcing seems to promote efficiency in imperfectly competitive industries. In this
respect the current trend of an increased degree of outsourcing should be welcomed by
industrial economists concerned not only with industry profits, but also with social
efficiency.
This brief discussion of the firms’ choice of organizational production mode has been
restricted to those of vertical integration (in-house production) or outsourcing. Of
course, in reality there is a full spectrum of additional organizational forms, like the
formation of joint ventures, available to firms. For an overview of existing studies of the
strategic incentives to form research joint ventures, we refer to Poyago-Theotoky
(1997). For more general approaches to analyse the interactions between asymmetric
information, divergence of objectives and the governance of joint ventures, we refer to
Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Rey and Tirole (1999).15
5.3 Compensation, bargaining and entrepreneurship when human capital is a
scarce resource
Side by side with the strongest bull market ever in the stock markets climaxing
throughout the western world during the first half of year 2000, we have witnessed a
hitherto unexperienced increase, both in an absolute and in a relative sense, in
compensations paid to top executives and key personnel. For example, the main
American federation of trade unions has estimated that, thanks largely to stock options,
the average American chief executive in 1999 earns 419 times the wage of the average
factory worker. This ratio should be compared to the fact that in 1980 such an executive
made 42 times as much as the average factory worker. In particular, stock-option
programmes have grown at a breathtaking pace. The Economist (1999) reports that the
200 largest American companies granted shares and share options to employees
amounting to 2 per cent of their outstanding equity during the year ending June 1998.
When added to incentive programmes made in previous years, it was estimated that the
accumulated value of the incentive schemes in effect at the end of 1998 amounted to as
much as 13.2 per cent of the corporate equity of these firms. While there has also been
an increase in the value of stock options granted to lower-ranking employees, most of
the value incorporated in these incentive schemes is concentrated in ‘mega-options’
directed to a fairly small number of top executives.
Many firms operating in the dynamic high-tech industries face an increasingly
demanding challenge in how to recruit the most promising human capital or how to
keep their key personnel. Partly this might reflect an increasing relative importance of
human capital compared with traditional capital investments, an aspect that might very
well be exemplified by industries like those of IT-consulting, Internet services and e-
commerce. In fact, Rajan and Zingales (2000) offer a number of convincing arguments
why the importance of a firm’s human capital, as represented by its employees, has
increased. These industries also serve as examples of industries where key personnel are
offered very lucrative compensation schemes. In particular, rival firms are engaged in
competition not only for the traditional product markets, but also for qualified human
capital equipped with bargaining power.
Partly the intensified battle for talent might also be significantly related to the structural
changes, which have taken place in the financial markets. In particular, the development
of the markets for outside equity, which could be exemplified by the dramatic growth
from the mid-1970s of the venture capital industry, has opened new opportunities for
entrepreneurship and start-ups for high-quality employees with new business ideas.
Thus, for key personnel equipped with potentially profitable business ideas and with
bargaining power relative to their employers, the large mass of investors with
preferences to invest in start-ups either directly or intermediated through funds,
represents an outside option which will presumably affect negotiations regarding
compensation contracts. In other words, a well-performing market for outside equity
might offer career options against which established firms have to defend themselves by
designing very lucrative compensation contracts in order to avoid small start-ups that
skim off talented employees. The still overheated markets for productive workers in IT-
consulting, Internet services and e-commerce offer examples of industries where this
might be a plausible mechanism for understanding the compensation contracts
observed.16
A recent study by Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) has its focus on the interrelationship
between bargaining power, entrepreneurship as an outside option and compensation
contracts. The authors concentrate on contract negotiations where not only the principal,
but also the agent possesses bargaining power. Secondly, the analysis is carried out in a
framework where the agent’s individual rationality constraint is not considered to be an
exogenous feature as in standard models of wage bargaining. Instead, entrepreneurship
represents the outside option available to the agent in his negotiations. In other words,
the outside option of the agent is to start up as an entrepreneur pursuing a business idea
closely related to the project he performs within the employment relationship. Within
such a context the approach by Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) offers characterizations
answering the following questions: Under such circumstances, how will shifts in
technology towards production functions with greater emphasis on human capital affect
negotiated compensation contracts? Can the dramatic increase in the compensation
directed to top executives and key personnel be explained by reduced imperfections in
the market for outside equity? And, if so, how precisely does the mechanism whereby
the market for human capital is tied to the competitiveness of the capital market
operate? Altogether this approach offers a characterization of how the competitiveness
of the capital market will impact on the imperfections in the labour market in an
environment where these imperfections are not based on bargaining power in the
traditional sense of union bargaining models, but rather on specialized non-alienable
human capital.
With an increasing relative importance of non-alienable human capital, the significance
of the interaction between financial institutions and corporate governance will increase
in the new economy, as emphasized by Mayer (2001). In particular, the new economy
will pose challenges for the joint design of financial claims and control rights so as to
encourage entrepreneurial initiative in the sense of Aghion and Tirole (1997).
6 Concluding comments
In this article we have emphasized innovation-intensive competition, strong
technological scale economies, network effects and complementarity between system
components as characteristic features of the core industries in the information economy.
In particular, the combination of strong technological scale economies on the supply
side and network effects on the demand side makes market structures with high
concentration and dominant firms both likely and efficient. On the other hand, a firm
possessing a dominant market position and operating in a network industry has access to
a more efficient set of instruments to abuse its dominant market position relative to a
firm operating in a traditional industry. Recognition of these two counteracting aspects
forms a necessary condition for the design of successful competition policy in
contemporary high-tech markets.
In light of the industry characteristics of the new economy industries, competition
authorities should maintain a high threshold of convincing themselves that a business
practice is, in fact, harmful (with reference to a well-justified time horizon) to
consumers, before judging the business practice in question illegal. Ideally, convincing
evidence should rely on consistent theoretical arguments as well as industry-specific
empirical data. Due to the Schumpeterian nature of the innovation-intensive competition
in high-tech industries, the successful acquisition of a dominant market position17
typically occurs at the expense of rivals. Of course, rivals losing in the innovation race
will typically be keen to raise complaints to antitrust authorities for anticompetitive
behaviour against technology winners. In facing such complaints, it is crucial for
competition authorities to distinguish between policies that protect competition from
those that protect competitors. Efficient competition policy is founded on the protection
of competition, not competitors.
In the presence of scale economies, efficient competition policy has always had to face
a structural trade-off between the exploitation of such scale economies and the
promotion of entry and small enterprises. In light of the characteristics of its core
industries, this trade-off is shifted towards more concentrated industry structures in the
information economy, because of stronger technological scale economics as well as
network effects. Or equivalently, the disadvantages in terms of efficiency from the
artificial promotion of fragmented industry structures are stronger in the information
economy than in traditional industries. Despite such a shift in the trade-off between the
exploitation of scale economies and the promotion of entry and small enterprises, it
should, nevertheless, be emphasized once again that the characteristics of a network
industry yield access to an extended set of sharp instruments for abusing dominant
market positions.
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